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Notes
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS UNDER THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
GOAL-ORIENTED MISSION FOR
RULE 37
*hile approaches to increase the eciency of judicial administration touch upon
many aspects of litigation, particular emphasis has been placed on aperceivedinabil-
ity of discovery sanctions to deal adequately with breakdowns in the discoveryproc-
ess. Historically, courts have assumed a posture of lenity in addressing sanctioning
choices, but recently a trend has developed that advocates harsherpenaltiesfor dis-
ruption of discovery both as a means of removing the delay caused by such conduct
and as a deterrent to similar conduct in thefuture. After outlining the role andpur-
poses of discovery, the author examines the analytical approaches used by courts in
applying discovery sanctions. He criticizes the Supreme Court-favored deterrence
theory because itfocusesprimarily onfuture recusant parties. Instead, he suggests a
multitude offactors that courts should consider in determining the appropriate dis-
covery sanction and concludes that such an approach would be more in keeping with
the goals of the federal rules.
INTRODUCTION
THE CRITICAL REACTION to the discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure has been a cyclic phenomenon.
Upon their debut in 1938, the new discovery rules were cordially
received as an important and prominent step forward.' The pas-
sage of time, however, led to a loss of favor among those who
study the rules and eventually to calls for revision.2 Ambiguities
inherent in the wording of rule 37 were of particular concern to
those attempting to achieve a more effective discovery procedure
since that rule provides the sanctions for a litigant's failure to
1. E.g., Clark, The Bar and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure, 25 A.B.A.J. 22,
23 (1939).
2. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480
(1958) was the seminal article in the reform movement that culminated in the 1970 amend-
ments. Also greatly influencial was the COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PROJECT FOR EFFECTIVE
JUSTICE, FIELD SURVEY OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL DISCOVERY (1965), which was directed by
Professor Rosenberg. "The input from the Columbia Survey allowed the Advisory Com-
mittee to make vital changes throughout the Rules in places where they suffered from am-
biguity or less than efficient procedures in practice." Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the
1970,4mendments, 8 COLUM. J.L. & SOc. PROB. 623, 644 (1972). One of the participants in
the Columbia project was William Glaser, whose subsequent book on discovery, PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM (1968), is cited at various points throughout
this Note. See generally Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940,
990-91 (1961).
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comply with all other discovery rules. 3 Reform was slow in com-
ing, but twelve years after the amendment movement began in
earnest, an ambitious series of revisions was promulgated and
adopted.4
Since the adoption of those amendments in 1970, a similar pat-
tern of criticism has emerged with regard to the new discovery
provisions. The general applause5 that greeted the amended rules
has since been eclipsed by a growing call for further reform.6 The
new discovery rules are now viewed as ineffective.7 In particular
rule 37 has been criticized as a less than adequate sanctioning tool
and as one of the fundamental weaknesses in the current scheme
of discovery.'
Critical analyses of the discovery provisions have appeared in
the literature and a series of amendments to the discovery rules
have been proposed.9 The courts have also begun to express more
concern over the perceived failure of the discovery rules to func-
tion effectively.' ° As the pressure for reform mounts, another sub-
3. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 486, 489-92.
4. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedurefor the United States District Cours, 398
U.S. 977 (1970).
5. E.g., Federal Discovery Rules: Effects ofthe 1970 Amendments, supra note 2, at
644. While generally laudatory of the discovery rules and their capacity for increasing
pretrial efficiency, this survey did not project success for the revised rule 37.
6. The reform movement has been especially concerned with the reluctance of many
courts to apply the rule 37 sanctions in an aggressive manner. A critical analysis of this
trend is found in the text accompanying notes 147-72 infra.
7. For a recent expression by the Supreme Court of dissatisfaction with the discovery
rules, see Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
8. E., Federal Discovery Rules. Effects of the 1970 Amendments, supra note 2, at
644. ("The single aspect of discovery that the 1970 amendments failed to improve relates
to the effectiveness of the sanctions which may be imposed for violation of the discovery
rules.")
9. For an in-depth analysis of discovery as it currently functions, some proposals for
reform, and a discussion of other proposals, see Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
Discovery. A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978). Both the
American Bar Association and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are considering
measures to reform the discovery rules. The Bar Association's Board of Governors has
approved the recommendations of its special panel investigating discovery reform and has
submitted them to the Advisory Committee. The result of the Advisory Committee's work
is the Preliminary Draft o/ Proposed Amendments, 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). Further action
upon this preliminary draft by both the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference is pending and, if history is
any indication, the proposals will undergo considerable changes before a final product is
complete.
10. E.g., National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied
Artist Pictures Corp., No. 79-7121 (2d Cir. June 28, 1979); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547
F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1977); Paine, Webber v. Inmobiliaria Melia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 543
[Vol. 29:603
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
stantial revision may well result. When and if that occurs, only
time will tell whether the new discovery rules will experience the
same boom-bust cycle of acceptance and rejection as did their
predecessors.
Meanwhile, as efforts to amend continue, the current rule 37
stands as the primary judicial mechanism for expediting the dis-
covery process once that process has been disrupted."' This Note
analyzes rule 37 in an attempt to develop a pattern for its applica-
tion that will increase efficiency in the discovery process. The ex-
ercise is not critical commentary or speculation upon any phase of
the proposed amendments, but rather a pragmatic view of the rule
as it is now formulated. Particular emphasis is given to the factors
considered by the judiciary in its discretionary choice of an appro-
priate rule 37 sanction and the deterrence theory of sanctioning
disruptions in the discovery process.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CIVIL DISCOVERY
Immediately upon the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 2 it was clear that federal practice and procedure had
undergone major surgery.' 3 From that moment on, it became
manifest that if the new rules were to function with the desired
efficacy both bench and bar would be required to take steps to
insure that the character of that surgery would be remedial rather
than cosmetic. The new discovery rules in particular were innova-
tive in terms of newly available methods'4 as well as new policy
directions in both pleading and pretrial practice.'- Gone was the
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Emerick v. Fenick Indus., Inc., 539
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1976).
11. E.g., Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958). Courts have, at times, looked to other provisions
of the Federal Rules for power to deal with disruptions in discovery. In particular, courts
have focused on rule 41(b) (involuntary dismissal of an action) and even rule 45(f) (con-
tempt as the result of failure to obey a subpoena). However, in the wake of Soidt& Interna-
tionale courts have come to recognize that "Rule 37 was unmistakably designed to generate
the principal enforcement power behind the array of discovery procedures and was doubt-
less intended to be the exclusive source of authority to punish evasion." Rosenberg, supra
note 2, at 483.
12. Rules ofProcedurefor the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1937).
13. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 62 (3d ed. 1976); P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN &
M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 5
(1978).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 30-31, 33-36.
15. See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at 5-10; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 81; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2001 (1970).
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era of fact and issue pleading. Notice pleading emerged rejecting
the notion that "pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome."'' 6 Gone too was the
era when surprise was a legitimate trial tactic. 7 Instead, pretrial
discovery devices were established to ensure full disclosure of
facts and issues before trial in order to help obtain the "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' 8 The
new discovery rules harbingered a transition from the procedural
dark ages of common law pleading to a more enlightened era of
pragmatic pretrial and trial practice,' 9 and reflected the evolution-
ary refinements of existing procedures in law and equity systemat-
ically distilled into a functional package.2° To understand the role
of the discovery process it is necessary to examine its common law
antecedents and the history of reform which produced the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2'
Common law pleading may be regarded as having six func-
tions: (1) to distill the controversy to one concise issue of fact or
law; (2) to reduce the issues of fact through the elimination of im-
material and incidental details; (3) to give notice of the contro-
versy to the parties and to the court; (4) to catalogue matter to be
proved at trial and to apportion the burden of proof between the
parties; (5) to provide a formal basis for judgment; and (6) to pre-
serve a record of the litigation.2 2 The primary function of the
process was the reduction of the case to its ultimate issues, but the
technicalities of common law pleading often enabled counsel to
subvert this aim.23 Pressure for reform mounted in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries until the first waves of change surfaced
16. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 98 (1957).
17. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 81; Holtzoff, The Elimination o/Surprise in Federal
Practice, 7 VAND. L. REV. 576 (1954). To some commentators, the attempts to eliminate or
minimize surprise were not necessarily a laudable aim. Eg., Hawkins, Discovery and Rule
34." What's So Wrong About Surprise?, 39 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1953). It has even been suggested
that discovery has failed in its effort to eliminate the use of surprise and that it may, in fact,
have had an opposite effect. W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 105-09 (1968).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
19. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 81.
20. See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at 5-9; M.
GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 120-22 (1972); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON LAW
PLEADING §§ 1-7 (1969); C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, §§ 61-62; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 15, § 2002.





in both England and the United States.24
The first procedural reform to attain a lasting influence was
The Code of Procedure of New York, or Field Code, of 1848.25 In
its basic provisions, the Field Code abolished the distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity,26 specifically delineated
the matter that was to appear in the pleadings,27 and broadened
the number of available discovery devices.28 In the century that
followed twenty-eight states used the Field Code as a model for
procedural reform, 29 but in many jurisdictions-including New
York-the courts engaged in a gradual process of adulterating
these innovations by reading into the code provisions policies of
common law.3°
While more than half the states were at least nodding in the
direction of procedural reform, procedure in the United States
District Courts remained entrenched in a quagmire of conflicting
systems. Law and equity were compartmentalized on their respec-
tive "sides" of the court, and procedure was different for each.
Discovery was in a primitive state, finding its clearest expression
in the very limited role granted it in the Federal Equity Rules.3 t
24. For a lucid history of this reform movement, see R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K.
CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 356-62 (4th ed. 1978).
It is interesting to note that in both England and the United States the greater impetus
toward reform came from the public and not the legal profession. Id at 356. See generally
Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1926).
25. 1848 N.Y. Laws ch. 379. For copious commentary on both the man and his code,
see DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS: CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
LEGAL REFORM (A. Reppy ed. 1949).
26. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 24, at 357.
27. Id at 358.
28. Id at 359. Other provisions mandated verification of most pleadings, limited the
number of permissible pleadings, restricted the use of demurrers, revised the rules ofjoin-
der of causes of action, and liberalized rules concerning joinder of parties, amended plead-
ings, and variances between pleadings and proof. Id
29. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 8 (2d ed. 1947).
30. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 20, at § 7.
31. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627
(1912). The sole provision in the Equity Rules that dealt with discovery was rule 58 which
allowed for a very restricted form of discovery practice. It read:
Disco very-Interrogatories-Inspection and Production of Documents-Admission of
Execution or Genuineness.
The plaintiff at any time after filing the bill and not later than twenty-one days
after the joinder of issue, and the defendant at any time after filing his answer and
not later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and either party at any
time thereafter by leave of the court or judge, may file interrogatories in writing
for the discovery by the opposite party or parties of facts and documents material
to the support of defense of the cause, with a note at the foot thereof stating which
of the interrogatories each of the parties is required to answer. But no party shall
file more than one set of interrogatories to the same party without leave of the
court or judge.
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Under the Conformity Act,3 2 the procedural rules of actions at
law were derived from the procedural rules of the state in which
the court sat, subject to a few federal statutes. The result was a
host of divergent procedural systems that became a lawyer's
nightmare.33
Unlike previous reforms, the struggle for a more manageable
procedural scheme in the federal courts arose from the ranks of
lawyers.34 The first salvo came in 1911 when the American Bar
Association adopted a resolution favoring rules of civil procedure
If any party to the cause is a public or private corporation, any opposite party
may apply to the court or judge for an order allowing him to file interrogatories to
be answered by any officer of the corporation, and an order may be made accord-
ingly for the examination of such officer as may appear to be proper upon such
interrogatories as the court or judge shall think fit.
Copies shall be filed for the use of the interrogated party and shall be sent by
the clerk to the respective solicitors of record, or to the last known address of the
opposite party if there be no record solicitor.
Interrogatories shall be answered, and the answers filed in the clerk's office,
within fifteen days after they have been served, unless the time be enlarged by the
court orjudge. Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully and the
answers shall be in writing, under oath, and signed by the party or corporate
officer interrogated. Within ten days after the service of interrogatories, objec-
tions to them, or any of them, may be presented to the court or judge, with proof
of notice of the purpose so to do, and answers shall be deferred until the objec-
tions are determined, which shall be at as early a time as is practicable. In so far
as the objections are sustained, answers shall not be required.
The court or judge, upon motion and reasonable notice, may make all such
orders as may be appropriate to enforce answers to interrogatories or to effect the
inspection or production of documents in the possession of either party and con-
taining evidence material to the cause of action or defense of his adversary. Any
party failing or refusing to comply with such an order shall be liable to attach-
ment, and shall also be liable, if a plaintiff, to have his bill dismissed, and, if a
defendant, to have his answer stricken out and be placed in the same situation as
if he had failed to answer.
By a demand served ten days before the trial, either party may call on the
other to admit in writing the execution or genuineness of any document, letter or
other writing, saving all just exceptions; and if such admission be not made within
five days after such service, the cost of proving the document, letter or writing
shall be paid by the party refusing or neglecting to make such admission, unless at
the trial the court shall find that the refusal or neglect was reasonable.
For commentary on equity rule 58 in the context of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, see Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 19-22 (1938).
32. Ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)).
33. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 24, at 361, described the situa-
tion:
A lawyer practicing in the state courts and United States District Courts of a
particular locality must thus have mastered three systems of procedure: the state
procedure (which might be unmerged, and therefore constitute two procedures);
the federal law-procedure (which was the state procedure in law actions but with
a federal overlay); and the federal equity-procedure. A lawyer practicing in fed-
eral courts throughout the country (as a government lawyer, for example, might
well do) must beware of the state procedures at law (as modified by the federal
overlay), for each state in which he appeared.
34. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 62, at 291.
[Vol. 29:603
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
prescribed by the Supreme Court." Blocking the path of such re-
form was the Conformity Act36 which, inter alia, repealed the
Supreme Court's dormant rulemaking authority in actions at com-
mon law. Over the next twenty-three years, the profession battled
a recalcitrant Congress 37 until the passage of the Enabling Act 38
cleared the path for Court-made procedural reform. That reform
came when the Supreme Court adopted, with some modifications,
the third draft propounded by its Advisory Committee.39
Among the myriad of changes in practice and procedure
ushered in by the new federal rules, the discovery rules4° assumed
particular significance. They were premised on the belief that
"prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclo-
sure of all relevant information in the possession of any person
unless the information is privileged."41 The discovery process be-
came the primary means of accomplishing that which historically
had been the function of the pleadings-that is, achieving "'the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."42
Thus, the discovery mechanism has three primary functions:
(1) to narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be
necessary to produce evidence only on a residue of matters that
are found to be actually disputed and controverted.
(2) to obtain evidence for use at the trial.
(3) to secure information about the existence of evidence that
may be used at trial ....
The failure to produce information validly sought within the
discovery process is an aberration which subverts the efforts to ful-
fill the objectives of that process. In order to eliminate the ill-
effect of such aberrations-and the sidetracking that results from
them-rule 37 provides the court with an array of sanctions that
may be imposed on the transgressing party. But unless a prag-
matic policy foundation supports the application of these sanc-
tions, they will not facilitate the smooth operation of discovery.
35. Id
36. Ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)).
37. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 62, at 291.
38. Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
39. Rules of Procedurefor the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1937).
Following the dictates of the Enabling Act, the rules were then submitted to Congress and
became law on September 16, 1938.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
41. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 81, at 398.
42. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). As a consequence of the expanded
role of discovery in civil practice, the pleadings assumed the subordinate role of a notice-
giving function. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
43. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2001, at 15.
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This is because the sanctioning process is jeopardized by its nebu-
lous constitutional underpinnings" and by the discretion invested
in the judiciary.45 Notwithstanding these obstacles, constant vigi-
lance toward the fundamental aim of the discovery process and
the role of discovery within the larger scheme of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure should provide standards for the application of
these discretionary sanctions under the current rule. Because the
sanctions are intended to remedy problems arising from discov-
ery, other problems in pretrial and trial practice must assume a
secondary position in the sanctioning process. Therefore, after an
examination of rule 37 and the constitutional confines of the dis-
covery sanctions, this Note will analyze policies and standards in
the application of those sanctions in an attempt to discern a pat-
tern in the exercise of discretion to achieve efficient sanctioning
under the current wording of the rule.
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37
In its original formulation, rule 37 contained an enumeration
of consequences that could befall a party for refusing to produce
validly sought discovery information.4 6 The rule as originally
44. See text accompanying notes 62-75 infra.
45. See text accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
46. After a technical adjustment in 1948, FED. R. Civ. P. 37 provided:
Refusal to Make Discovery. Consequences
(a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any
question propounded upon oral examination, the examination shall be completed
on other matters or adjourned, as the proponent of the question may prefer.
Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, he may apply to
the court in the district where the deposition is taken for an order compelling an
answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer any interrogatory submitted
under Rule 31 or upon the refusal of a party to answer any interrogatory submit-
ted under Rule 33, the proponent of the question may on like notice make like
application for such an order. If the motion is granted and the court finds that the
refusal was without substantial justification the court shall require the refusing
party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal or either of them
to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is denied
and if the court finds that the motion was made without substantial justification,
the court shall require the examining party or the attorney advising the motion or
both of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(b) Failure to Comply With Order.
(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to
answer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in
which the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of
that court.
(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a
party refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring
him to answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce
any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to per-
[Vol. 29:603
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drafted, however, proved to be an inadequate means of effectuat-
ing the discovery devices.4 7 As difficulties arose and problems in
the administration of the discovery process snowballed, it became
evident to the legal community that a restructuring of rule 37 (as
well as the other discovery rules) was in order. As a result, rules
26 to 37 received an extensive facelift in 1970.48
In its revised form, rule 3749 gained a posture designed not
mit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order
made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination.
the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among
others the following:
(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or
the character or description of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or
the physical or mental condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall
be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order,
(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence
designated documents or things or items of testimony, or from introducing evi-
dence of physical or mental condition;
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party:
(iv) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such
orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
(c) Expenses on Refusal To Admit. If a party, after being served with a re-
quest under Rule 36 to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of
any matters of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth
of any such matter of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the
other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof,
including reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good
reasons for the denial or that the admissions sought were of no substantial impor-
tance, the order shall be made.
(d) Failure of Party To Attend or Serve Answers. If a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take
his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to
interogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of such interrogato-
ries, the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading
of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a
judgment by default against that party.
(e) Failure To Respond to Letters Rogatory. A subpoena may be issued as
provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1783, under the circumstances and conditions
therein stated.
(f) Expenses Against United States. Expenses and attorney's fees are not to
be imposed upon the United States under this rule.
47. See W. GLASER, supra note 17, at 156; Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 486; Develop-
ments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 2, at 990-91.
48. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedurefor the United States District Courts, 398
U.S. 977 (1970).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 currently provides:
Failure To Make Discovery: Sanctions
(a) Motionfor Order Compelling Discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice
to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compel-
ling discovery as follows:
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
only to react to the changes made simultaneously in the discovery
(a) Appropriate Court. An application for an order to a party may be made
to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition,
to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An application for
an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district
where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submit-
ted under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designa-
tion under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may
move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling
inspection in accordance with the request. When taking a deposition on oral ex-
amination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examina-
tion before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such protective
order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made pursuant to
Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer. For the purposes of this subdivision an
evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall,
after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct neces-
sitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them
to pay the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order,
including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make the award of expenses
unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require
the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred
in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the
making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(b) Failure to Compiy with Order.
(1) Sanctions by Court in District Where Deposition is Taken. If a deponent
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court
in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be consid-
ered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party, or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6)
or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35,
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order,
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35 (a)
requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in
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rules, but also to rectify administrative bottlenecks." The first
major alteration was made in the caption of rule 37 which was
changed from "Refusal to Make Discovery: Consequences" to
"Failure to Make Discovery: Sanctions." In fact, throughout the
entire revised rule, "failure" was substituted for "refusal" and
"sanctions" for "consequences." The former substitution is ex-
plained in the Advisory Committee Notes which accompany the
1970 amendments;5" the latter is more or less left to the imagina-
tion. 2
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to comply
shows that he is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, un-
less the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Expenses on Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of
any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the docu-
ment or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring
the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof,
including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make an order unless it finds
that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the ad-
mission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit
has reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there
was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) Failure ofParty to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answer to Interroga-
tories or Respond to Requestfor Inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to
testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or
objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of in-
terrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submit-
ted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court in which the
action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among other it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A),
(B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him
or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless -the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) Subpoena ofPerson in Foreign Country. A subpoena may be issued as
provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1783, under the circumstances and conditions
therein stated.
(f) Expenses Against United States. Except to the extent permitted by stat-
ute, expenses and fees may not be awarded against the United States under this
rule.
50. Advisory Committee'r Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Dis-
covery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 538 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Notes].
51. Id at 538-39.
52. There is no express reference to this alteration in the Advisory Committee Notes.
The word "sanction," however, is used throughout the seminal article of the reform move-
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The failure-refusal substitution was addressed to a difference
perceived by courts in the connotations of the two words, both of
which appeared in the 1938 language.5 3 Courts attached a meas-
ure of wilfullness to "refusal" and thus created a dichotomy in the
application of the rule based on the state of mind of the transgres-
sor. This bifurcated analysis of breakdowns in the discovery proc-
ess persisted even after the Supreme Court declared that "refusal"
as used in old rule 37(b)(2) was merely a failure to comply and
that the state of mind of the party who failed to make discovery
was relevant only with regard to the penalty, if any, to be as-
sessed. 4 Thus, the word "refusal" was excised from rule 37 to
dispel past confusion and to comport with the dictates of the
Supreme Court.55
The replacement of the word "consequences" with "sanctions"
was apparently an effort by the rulemakers to replace the passive
connotations of a mere consequence with the more active and au-
thoritative aura associated with a sanction. If such a shift in em-
phasis were intended, it would comport with the purpose of the
revisions-to assert rule 37 as the primary weapon of courts to
thwart recalcitrance within the discovery process. 6
The 1970 revision of rule 37 went well beyond nuances, se-
mantics, and emphasis. It represented a comprehensive effort by
the rulemakers to energize court responses to noncompliance dur-
ing discovery and to bolster provisions in the original rule that
were perceived to have a dilatory effect upon the information-
gathering procedures. 57 For example, the old rule allowed assess-
ment of costs if the recusant party acted without substantial justifi-
cation. 8 The new rule requires an assessment unless such a
failure to comply can be substantially justified.59 Thus, the bur-
den of avoiding an assessment rests squarely on the party whose
conduct led to the breakdown in discovery. Another manifesta-
ment that lead to the 1970 amendments. Rosenberg, supra note 2. Similarly, Socidtd Inter-
nationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958), speaks in terms of sanctions.
53. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 50, at 538-39.
54. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
55. Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 50, at 539.
56. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958); Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 50, at 539.
57. Id at 538-39.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a), (c), 308 U.S. 645, 710 (1939).
59. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).
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tion of the new rule's more aggressive attitude toward failure to
make discovery is found in the consideration given the recusant
party's state of mind. Rule 37 no longer permits consideration of
whether the failure to comply was willful when the court is faced
with the decision whether or not to impose a sanction.60 Thus, the
revised rule permits sanctions for even negligent failures and
shifts the inquiry from subjective to objective considerations. 6'
Nevertheless, the court's perception of the transgressing party's
frame of mind remains a pertinent element in its selection of the
appropriate sanction.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS OF DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Despite its broad provisions and purely discretionary charac-
ter, rule 37 remains a limited tool because of restraints on its dis-
covery sanctions imposed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 62 These due process limitations find their expression
in three Supreme Court opinions, only one of which was decided
after rule 37 was promulgated. In order to sketch the constitu-
tional framework of the sanctioning process, each case is consid-
ered separately.
Hovey v. Elliott,63 although it did not involve a discovery issue,
stands as the Supreme Court's first in-depth analysis of the discre-
tionary power of a court when faced with a party's refusal to obey
a court order. In Hovey, the defendant disobeyed an order to de-
posit a sum of money with the court.' In response, the judge
struck the defendant's answer and entered a decree pro confesso
against him.65 The decree was collaterally attacked on the theory
that due process had been violated by the entry of the decree.66
That argument reached a sympathetic Supreme Court which held
that a complete denial of an opportunity for a trial on the merits
was a constitutionally inappropriate response to a contempt of
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
61. This shift in emphasis was indicated by the Supreme Court in Soci6t6 Internatio-
nale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208
(1958).
62. This is not to suggest that the selection of discovery sanctions is in any great meas-
ure constrained by the fifth amendment; indeed, the constitutional framework embraces a
formidably flexible scheme.
63. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
64. Id at411.
65. Id at 411-12.
66. Id at 413.
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court.6 7
Twelve years later in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,6 the
Supreme Court substantially modified the rule set forth in Hovey
and in so doing crafted the constitutional basis for the original
formulation of rule 37.69 In Hammond Packing, the defendant
company refused to comply with a court order made pursuant to
an Arkansas statute that required defendants in state antitrust ac-
tions to produce certain specified documents and witnesses.7" In
response, the Arkansas court struck the defendant's answer and
entered a default judgment.7" Affirming that judgment, the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the entry
of a default judgment was contrary to the doctrine announced in
Hovey. The Court noted that in Hovey due process was denied
because the trial court had refused to hear the merits. In the pres-
ent case, however, due process was preserved by the lower court's
"presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the
administration of due process was but an admission of the want of
merit in the asserted defense."
72
Rule 37 was originally drafted to conform to the due process
boundaries set forth in Hovey and Hammond Packing.71 Unfortu-
nately, neither the rule nor the Advisory Committee's comments
provided a thoroughly satisfactory set of limits for the exercise of
the discretionary sanctioning power accorded district courts under
rule 37.74 Further interpretation and elucidation of Hovey and
Hammond Packing-and a construction of rule 37-were in order
when the Supreme Court again addressed the issue in SociWtA In-
ternationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
V. Rogers.
75
In Socitb Internationale, the district court dismissed the action
brought by the plaintiff, a Swiss corporation, for failure to comply
67. Id at 446.
68. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
69. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2283.
70. 212 U.S. at 338-40.
71. Id at 340.
72. Id at 350-51.
73. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2283.
74. The Advisory Committee explained its position regarding the constitutional limits
by stating that "[tihe provisions of this Rule ... are in accord with Hammond Packing v.
Arkansas. . .which distinguishes between the justifiable use of such measures as a means
of compelling the production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliot
...for the mere purpose of punishing for contempt." Id § 2283, at 760 n.45 (quoting the
comments of the Advisory Committee which drafted the 1938 Rules).
75. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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with a court order to produce documents requested pursuant to
rule 34.76 In refusing to comply, the plaintiff advanced the justifi-
cation that if it were to comply with the court order, its action
would constitute a criminal violation of Swiss law.77 The
Supreme Court was thereby faced with a situation not unlike the
refusal in Hammond Packing, but colored by an arguably merito-
rious justification.
In resolving the quandary presented by SociWtk Internationale,
the Court referred to Hovey and Hammond Packing as having de-
lineated a constitutional limit on a court's capacity to deny a party
the opportunity for trial on the merits even when the court seeks
to advance its own processes.78 Yet, the Court viewed those deci-
sions as having left "open the question whether Fifth Amendment
due process is violated by the striking of a complaint because of a
plaintiff's inability, despite good-faith efforts, to comply with a
pretrial production order. ' 79 The Court noted that the dismissal
by the district court raised "substantial constitutional ques-
tions,"80 but promptly sidestepped those questions by resolving
the matter with an interpretation of rule 37.18 The Court held that
"Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this
complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial
production order when it has been established that failure to com-
ply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or
any fault of petitioner."82 Although the Court asserted that even a
good faith failure to respond to a court order constituted noncom-
pliance, it recognized that the party's good faith should be consid-
ered in determining the severity of the sanction to be imposed
under rule 37.83
Societe Internationale provided an impetus for the movement
to reform rule 37.14 In revising the rule, however, the Advisory
Committee chose not to incorporate the holding of the case into
the new language but rather to restructure the rule to accommo-
76. Id at 198.
77. Id at 200.
78. Id at 209.
79. Id at 210.
80. Id
81. Id at 212.
82. Id
83. Id at 208. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2283, at 762.
84. The reform suggestions first appeared in the literature in Rosenberg, supra note 2,
which was published while SociAtW Internationale was pending before the Supreme Court.
Socikti Internationale highlighted the concerns expressed in Professor Rosenberg's article.
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date Socitass lesson. The revised rule eliminated all references to
"willful" conduct and "refusal" to disclose, thus expanding the
rule to include negligent and good faith failures to comply. 5 The
element of willfulness became merely a factor for the Court to
consider in choosing the appropriate sanction. But later events
have indicated that there was no need to incorporate the holding
of Soci&t. Internationale into the revised rule. Courts have paid
heed to its doctrine by exercising restraint in imposing drastic
sanctions in good faith contexts.86
Questions persist regarding the discretionary selection of a dis-
covery sanction within the confines of Hovey, Hammond Packing,
and Socibt' Internationale. An examination of individual cases in
which sanctions have been imposed is not particularly informative
because the vagaries of the district courts are usually accompanied
by Spartan analysis.87 Neither constitutional limitations nor So-
citb Internationale is discussed with much regularity. Indeed, a
case that goes beyond pure discretion in analyzing the application
of a sanction is the exception rather than the rule.88
85. See text accompanying notes 49-56 supra.
86. For a discussion of the effect of good faith efforts toward compliance on court
imposed sanctions, see Annot., 2 A.L.R. Fed. 811 (1969).
87. Typically, when assessing the propriety of a sanction, courts merely state the facts
and then proclaim starkly that a particular sanction is just or unjust. In United States v.
One 1964 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 41 F.R.D. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court described the
facts and the motion under rule 37 and then, after noting that striking a pleading and
dismissal are harsh sanctions, presented the following sentence as its analysis: "Under the
circumstances I conclude that the laxity demonstrated by the government in this case does
not constitute a 'wilfull' failure to serve answers which would warrant dismissal of the
action." Id at 354. Another example of sparse analysis is the cryptic opinion in French v.
Zalstem-Zalessky, I F.R.D. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). In that case, a defendant's pleadings
were apparently stricken after an abortive effort to secure a protective order and the subse-
quent failure by the defendant to appear for an unspecified examination. Only one sen-
tence in the opinion even remotely touched upon the selection of the sanction: "Parties
over whom the court has acquired jurisdiction and who fail to respond to a notice for
examination pursuant to Rule 26 et seq. may be penalized by striking out a pleading." Id
at 240. No other rationale for the sanction was stated. This paucity of analysis prompted
one commentator to describe the case law on this subject as "plenteous but diffuse." Ro-
senberg, supra note 2, at 489. But see Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 859 (1968). Here the court analyzed the factual basis of
the imposition of the sanction and gave great weight to the diligence and good faith of the
recusant party's attempts to comply. Id at 119-21. Moreover, the discretionary analysis
recognized the due process limitations on sanctioning. Id at 121.
88. For an excellent example of an effort by a court to relate its analysis to multifari-
ous considerations of policy and purpose within a particular factual setting, see Ketchikan
Cold Storage Co. v. Alaska, 491 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1971) (construing ALASKA Civ. R. 37(b),
the substantial equivalent of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)). The Ketchikan court focused on the
severity of the sanction (both in the abstract and in light of the particular facts), the rela-
tionship of the sanction to the critical issue of the case, the purpose of the rule, the good
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This is not surprising since it is much simpler for a court to
rely upon its discretion in imposing a sanction than to analyze its
action according to standards of due process and the policy con-
siderations underlying rule 37. While such a technique may be
expeditious, it obscures the purposes of discovery. The court must
be aware of the outer limits of its discretion and the need to delin-
eate factors considered in the exercise of its sanctioning power
under rule 37.
IV. THE ANATOMY OF THE SANCTIONING PROCESS
In order to place rule 37 in its proper perspective within the
adjudicatory process and to visualize the various alternatives
available to the parties and the court during the sanctioning proc-
ess, a brief step-by-step outline will be helpful. An action is
brought, pleadings, are filed, and at some point thereafter, the par-
ties, in preparation of their cases, initiate discovery.89 For the pur-
poses of this illustration, assume that the defendant has failed to
supply an answer to an interrogatory served by the plaintiff pursu-
ant to rule 33. If the defendant believes that the information
sought by the plaintiff is beyond the scope of discovery as outlined
in rule 26(b), he may seek a protective order.90 The court will
entertain arguments from the parties concerning the nature and
scope of the information sought and rule on the propriety of the
discovery desired in response to the motion for a protective order.
If, however, the defendant does not avail himself of a protective
order, and fails, for whatever reason, to respond to the interro-
gatory, the plaintiff may then seek an order compelling discovery
pursuant to rule 37(a).9' In considering a rule 37(a) motion, the
faith of the recusant party, and the availability of a lesser sanction to achieve an adequate
judicial response to the breakdown in the discovery. Id at 146-48.
89. The scope and bounds of the discovery process are found in FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
9 1. Within the context of this illustration, the examination focuses on the sanctioning
process under rule 37(b). The sanctions found in that subdivision cannot be imposed un-
less a court order issued under rule 37(a) has been violated. The sanctions called into play
by rules 37(c) and (d) may be invoked even in the absence of a court order. Rule 37(c)
"provides a sanction for a failure to make an admission requested under Rule 36 .... It
makes the admission procedure. . . workable with a minimum of judicial intervention by
imposing on a litigant who improperly refuses to admit a matter the cost of proving it." 8
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2290, at 801. Rule 37(d) addresses "especially
serious disregard of the obligations imposed. . . by the discovery rules even though [the
conduct] has not violated any court order." Id § 2291, at 807. It enables a court acting on
motion to deal promptly with matters such as failure to appear for a deposition, failure to
answer an interrogatory, or failure to serve written response to a request for inspection.
Rule 37(d) is not resorted to absent flagrant failure to fulfill discovery obligations. Id
19791
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
court will address the propriety of the discovery sought92 and will
respond to the situation presented in accordance with the discre-
tionary function and sanctions available under rule 37,93 bearing
in mind the limitations on the sanctioning process as a result of
Hovey, Hammond Packing, and Soci&tb Internationale.94
It is at this point that the court's views, not only of the factual
pattern presented to it but also of the discovery and adjudicatory
processes, becomes determinative of the outcome of the proceed-
ings to follow. Facing a breakdown in the discovery process, the
court must act affirmatively to move the litigation from its immo-
bile state.95 The discovery procedures will either be returned to a
course that will promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination"96 of the action, or will be hopelessly short-circuited.97
The rule 37 sanctions are made available at the discretion of the
court both to eliminate the obstruction that has arisen and to do
justice to the party seeking the order, the non-compliant party, the
court itself, and the adjudicatory system. In addressing such a sit-
uation in which a multiplicity of factors must be evaluated, the
court is fortunate not to be bound by rigid and unyielding princi-
ples. Rather, "[t]he sanctions enumerated in the rule are not ex-
clusive and arbitrary, but flexible, selective, and plural. The court
may, within reason, use as many and as varied sanctions as are
necessary to hold the scales of justice even."9
But just as flexibility is the hallmark of the discovery sanc-
tions, discretion is the linchpin of that flexibility. The guidance
92. The propriety of the discovery sought is not at issue at the time the sanctions
under rule 37(b) are actually imposed; that issue is addressed only when the rule 37(a)
motion is sought. E.g., Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 2, at 986.
93. Rule 37 leaves the matter completely to the discretion of the court. 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2284. This discretion is, of course, extremely personal be-
cause "regardless of the degree of emphasis within a provision, the discretionary decision
must still be left in the hands of the judge." Federal Discovery Rules: Effects ofthe 1970
Amendments, supra note 2, at 643.
94. The rule commands those sanctions "as are just." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), (d).
Those three words--"as are just"-provide the margin for discretion which makes analysis
within the sanctioning process so difficult. See text accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
95. In the present scheme, judicial control of the discovery process does not exist until
a complete breakdown in the process causes a party to seek such control under rule 37.
This lack of judicial control has been pinpointed as one of the most serious flaws in the
current scheme of discovery. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13,
at 21-26.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
97. See text accompanying notes 146-52 infra.
98. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2284.
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provided by rule 37 is meager, requiring the court to impose such
sanctions "as are just."99 Under this rubric, the court's discretion
is both a powerful tool and a safety valve when faced with a diffi-
cult decision. As a result, courts may be tempted to cloak a vis-
ceral reaction to a difficult issue in the guise of discretion rather
than to tackle the demanding task of analyzing the subjective and
objective qualities of the matter and the underlying purposes of
discovery. This is not to suggest that the discretionary function is
not central to a reasoned and pragmatic approach to applying dis-
covery sanctions. On the contrary, it is a pivotal elementprovided
that the purposes of discovery and the fundamental aim of the
adjudicatory process remain the framework for the court's deci-
sion.
In attempting to sketch guidelines for the exercise of discretion
in the choice of sanctions under rule 37, it is helpful to refer to
Dean Pound's observations:
[T]he significant thing is not the fixed rule but the margin of
discretion involved in the standard and its regard for the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. For three characteristics
may be seen in legal standards: (1) they all involve a certain
moral judgment upon conduct. It is to be "fair", or "conscien-
tious", or "reasonable", or "prudent", or "diligent". (2) they
do not call for exact legal knowledge exactly applied, but for
common sense about common things or trained intuition about
things outside everyone's experience. (3) they are not formu-
lated absolutely or given an exact content. . . but are relative
to times and places and circumstances and are to be applied
with reference to the facts of the case in hand. They recognize
that within the bounds fixed each case is to a certain extent
unique.1
With regard to discovery sanctions, a sense of policies and pur-
poses serves as the bounds for the "margin of discretion": discre-
tion must be oriented to the needs of the parties and the court, and
the fundamental aims of the discovery process.
It is both impossible to formulate a body of concrete rules con-
cerning the imposition of discovery sanctions and unwise to do so
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
100. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 57-58 (1974). Dean
Pound's philosophies on judicial administration are noted in a recent article on efficiency
in discovery. Becker, Modern Discovery.- Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of
Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978). Judge Becker confines his
remarks to a critical analysis of a proposed change in rule 26. He criticizes proposals
designed to limit the control of litigation by the trial judge in discovery matters and to
return to the specificity of issue pleading, calling them "reactionary proposals that are con-
trary to the clear and explicit reachings of Dean Pound." Id at 267.
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because such standards would force unique factual situations into
generalities devoid of the equitable considerations central to the
discretionary function.10' Nevertheless, some observations may
be made concerning the imposition of sanctions under rule 37
based on court decisions and practice: (1) if the failure to respond
to a request for discovery is the result of inability rather than will-
ful refusal, bad faith, or fault, the less severe sanctions are in-
voked; '02 (2) drastic sanctions are generally judiciously employed
and saved only for the most flagrant abuses; 03 (3) conditional or-
ders are often employed in lieu of final sanctions as a prod for
balking parties; ° (4) courts may refrain from imposing any sanc-
tion where it is deemed inappropriate; 0 5 (5) the imposition of
sanctions is often tempered with leniency. 06
It has been argued that one of the primary shortcomings of the
discovery process is that the courts have been far too lenient in
applying sanctions.0 7 Historically, it appears that judges were
hesitant to impose the rule 37 sanctions.0 8 This attitude has been
ascribed to a concern for the disposition of cases on the merits and
thus is completely in accord with the purposes of the discovery
process. 0 9 Nevertheless, some courts, including the Supreme
Court, have recently drifted from this pattern of lenity and appear
to be more intent on punishing transgressors than on fashioning
remedial orders to encourage compliance with discovery orders. 0
The Supreme Court's more punitive approach to sanctioning is
101. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
102. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
103. Eg., Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
104. Eg., Hendricks v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 32 F.R.D. 169 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
105. E.g., Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
106. Eg., Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957). (The opinion was written by
Judge Clark, the draftsman of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
107. National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976); Rosenberg, supra note 2; Developments in the
Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1961); Note, Recent Innovations to PretrialDiscov-
ery Sanctions.- Rule 37 Reinterpreted, 1959 DUKE L.J. 278; Note, The Emerging Deterrence
Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
108. Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHi. L. REv. 297, 327 (1940)
("The courts, exhibiting a generous attitude toward the recusant party, have deemed it
better to withhold the thunderbolt on condition of future compliance than to foreclose
determination of the matter on its merits.").
109. 1d; W. GLASER, supra note 17, at 154-56.
110. National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1977); Paine, Webber v. In-
mobiliara Melia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 543 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907
(1977); Emerick v. Fenick Indus., Inc., 539 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1976).
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reflected in National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc. I" In that case, the Court held that the district court
had not abused its discretion in applying the sanction of dismissal
because of the plaintiffs' "'flagrant bad faith' and their counsel's
'callous disregard of their responsibilities.' ""2 The Court ex-
plained that the issue in determining whether such a dismissal
should be reversed is not whether, as an original matter, the appel-
late court would have decided the case differently but whether the
lower court had abused its discretion.'
1 3
National Hockey League is a pivotal case in the development
of the policy considerations underlying the selection of discovery
sanctions. It signifies a subordination of lenity in the imposition
of sanctions in favor of the theory that noncompliance can be de-
terred through the imposition of harsh sanctions.1 4 Thus, the
next step in this analysis of rule 37 and its application is this con-
flict between the traditional and more lenient approach to the im-
position of discovery sanctions and the emerging emphasis on
deterrence. This investigation requires a consideration of policy
and practice in order to determine which philosophy better serves
the objectives of the discovery process and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
V. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
The failure of a party to respond to discovery requests disrupts
and delays a lawsuit. 5 It is the elimination of this disruption that
prompts the rule 37 remedy." 6 Rule 37 offers a wide array of
remedial devices,"17 but only minimal guidance regarding the ex-
ercise of discretion in the selection of the most appropriate rem-
111. 427 U.S. 639, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976). See text accompanying notes
153-59 infira.
112. Id at 643.
113. Id at 642.
114. It should perhaps be noted that too much emphasis can be placed upon this lenity-
deterrence distinction. After all, both terms refer to nothing more than the attitude held by
the court in approaching a sanctioning decision. The court has many factors, interests, and
policies to weigh in making such an analysis and the attitude-be it lenient or harsh-must
find its place within the more crucial factors considered by the court.
115. It must be remembered that the imposition of a discovery sanction is based on a
construction of the applicable section of rule 37, a rule which "shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
116. A remedy is simply the "means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury
. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1457 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
117. The recourses available to the court were very early recognized as a "truly amaz-
ing array of sanctions." Pike & Willis, supra note 108, at 326.
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edy. Some guidance may be gleaned from the consideration that
the essence of effective remedial action is the coordination of the
remedy selected with the right being sought." 8 When applying
rule 37 sanctions, the court must be mindful that "the remedy is
merely the means of carrying into effect a substantive principle or
policy" and that "the remedy should be selected and measured to
match that policy." '" 9
Putting aside for the moment whether a court should subscribe
to a theory of lenity or a theory of deterrence in applying sanc-
tions under rule 37,120 it would appear that the inadequacies of the
discovery sanctions stem from an avoidance of policy-oriented
analysis in the selection of the appropriate remedial response.' 2'
Cognizance of the inter-relationship between right and remedy
supplies the firmest foundation for determining the appropriate
sanction. Sensitivity to this congruence between right and remedy
requires the perception that rule 37 sanctions vary in the severity
of their impact on the recusant party. Thus, the nature and effect
of each sanction will be individually discussed.
The sanction of taking certain facts as established 22 may per-
mit resolution of the dispute on the merits provided that the facts
so established relate to issues subordinate to the ultimate resolu-
tion of the controversy. However, if the facts withheld by a party
and later established by the court relate to a determinative issue,
then the establishment sanction may be little more than a mas-
querade for dismissal with prejudice. 23 Certainly there are in-
stances in which fairness to the moving party and the
administration of justice dictate that the recusant party be pre-
cluded from presenting his version of the merits. Yet the more
appropriate response is to dismiss with prejudice rather than to
manipulate the provisions of the rule so that specific factual situa-
tions transform one sanction into another. The same considera-
tions and possible results apply to the sanction of precluding a
118. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2 (1973).
119. Id
120. See text accompanying notes 152-67 infra.
121. See note 87 supra.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
123. See, e.g., McMullen v. Travelers Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 364
U.S. 867 (1960), where the court stated: "[W]e can find no abuse of discretion, even though
the court may have done in two steps what could have been done in one." Id at 835.
Nevertheless, rules 37(b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(c) provide for two separate remedies. The con-
struction of the rule logically requires that each sanction have its own role.
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claim or defense by barring relevant evidence.24
The striking of a pleading,'25 dismissal of a cause without
prejudice, 26 and a stay of proceedings 27 all enable the processes
of discovery and litigation to begin again. Such sanctions, as a
response to relatively minor disruptions allow the recusant party
to reconsider its position yet still have an opportunity to obtain a
resolution on the merits. 12 8 Dismissal with prejudice' 29 and the
entry of a default judgment 30 are the most drastic sanctions found
in rule 37 because both result in the resolution of the dispute with-
out reference to the merits. The use of these sanctions represents
an admission by the court that the adjudicatory process has failed
its goal of a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"'13' of
the action. Therefore, these drastic penalties should be reserved
for the most egregious and unremediable disruptions of the dis-
covery mechanism.' 32
The assessment of costs and expenses 33 against the noncomp-
liant party represents both prod and punishment. A threat of be-
ing charged for a delay, even if the amount is not great, still
represents an unnecessary expenditure. Such an assessment after
belated compliance serves as a reminder that even a relatively mi-
nor disruption may result in costs that need not be incurred.
However, the sanction should not be out of proportion to the of-
fense; therefore, costs, including attorneys' fees, should be dictated
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
126. Id
127. Id
128. E.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1209 (1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1162 (1974) (struck pleading); Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
22 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stay of proceedings). A stay has a further encouraging
effect upon a recalcitrant plaintiff because such an order is not immediately appealable. 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Of course, if the recusant party were a defendant stalling for time, a
stay would be an inappropriate sanction.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
130. Id
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
132. Dismissal with prejudice seems to be the sanction most often imposed on plaintiffs
who obstruct the orderly progression of the suit which they had instituted. Eg., Interstate
Cigar Co. v. Consolidated Cigar Co., 317 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1963). There may also be
constitutional limits upon the use of such sanctions. See notes 62-75 supra and accompa-
nying text. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D) permits an additional sanction: "treating as a con-
tempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination." This sanction, while not surfacing with any degree of regularity,
does provide the court a further tool for compelling compliance mandated by the rule 37(a)
order.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E).
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by notions of fairness. The provision that the recusant party's at-
torney may be personally assessed these costs and expenses
34
lends depth to a court's ability to deal with some forms of dilatory
conduct. After all, decisions concerning responses to discovery re-
quests are generally made by the lawyer. This sanction may more
effectively dissuade counsel from sidestepping the processes of the
court. 135 It further serves to allay the fears of those who deem it
unfair that a party may be punished for the actions of his counsel.
Unfortunately, the sanction is rarely imposed.'
36
The so-called creative sanctions of rule 37-those orders "as
are just"137-are seldom imposed. When used they generally take
the form of conditional orders threatening a drastic sanction
should the noncompliance continue. 13  The remedial value of
conditional orders is difficult to gauge. The order may give the
recalcitrant party time to re-analyze his failure to respond and
possibly to conclude that compliance is his best option, or it may
merely serve the recusant party's desire for further delay. Hence,
in evaluating the propriety of a conditional order, the court must
be extremely sensitive to the motivations of the noncompliant
party.' 39
To this juncture, various components which serve as analytical
factors in a court's approach to the sanctioning process have been
discussed: the fundamental aid of the adjudicatory process, 40 the
purposes of discovery,' 4 1 the policy underlying procedure in gen-
eral and discovery in particular, 142 discretion, 143 remedial congru-
ence, 144 and the possible effects of the individual sanctions.
45
One other indispensible factor in the court's equation must be
considered-the interests of the actors in the courtroom. The
134. Id
135. Such a concern is expressed in analyzing the leniency in assessing sanctions in
Brazil, supra note 9, at 1343.
136. W. GLASER, supra note 17, at 155.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). The list of sanctions under rule 37(b)(2) is not meant to
be exhaustive because the rule states that the order listed may be made "among others."
138. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 495. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15,
§ 2284, at 768-71.
139. Motivational analysis should not be restricted to considerations involving condi-
tional orders. The perceived motive of the delaying party is a touchstone in the court's
equitable use of its discretionary remedial authority. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 115-21 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 122-39 supra.
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court must balance the interests of the moving party, the interests
of the recusant party, and its own interests in the administration of
justice. The interests of the moving party include the most
favorable resolution of the claim made by or against him, and the
optimal exploitation of the procedural devices available to him.
The rights of the recusant party are the same as those of the mo-
vant, plus the right to an examination of the factors that prompted
his noncompliance. The court's interests focus upon the meritori-
ous resolution of the dispute before it, the protection of the rights
and interests of the parties before it, and the administration of the
judicial system to afford its maximum adaptability to the needs of
all who seek to use it.
This balance of interests must be accomplished within the con-
tours of the sanctioning process previously discussed and within
the factual context of each case. The recognition of all these con-
siderations, particularly the fundamental aim of the Rules of Civil
Procedure-the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action" 146-- mandates that in selecting the appropriate sanc-
tion the emphasis be on an immediate and effective means of re-
moving the obstacle, unburdened by considerations with which
the discovery process is not concerned. A corollary to this is the
realization that in imposing a sanction, purely punitive action,
based on a policy of deterrence, must assume a secondary role to
the primary thrust of employing sanctions to fulfill the mission of
discovery within the adjudicatory process. If, within the confines
of the interests of all involved and the interests of the processes at
work, lenity is a necessary component of fairness, then the notions
of deterrence and punishment must be cast in a subordinate role.
But, in instances of flagrant abuse of the discovery mechanism, the
administration of justice and the vindication of the discovery
process may require that lenity give way to harsher sanctions.
The deterrence theory, by its very nature, rejects lenity in the
judicial application of discovery sanctions. Deterrence, if ac-
cepted as the policy guide in the application of discovery sanc-
tions, requires harsher action in response to noncompliance both
to remedy the infraction in the present case and, more impor-
tantly, to discourage similar conduct in the future. 147 There are,
however, fundamental weaknesses in such an approach. The stif-
fer and swifter penalties resulting from the deterrence theory,
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
147. Note, supra note 107.
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while arguably discouraging noncompliance, do not actively en-
courage the parties to cooperate within the structure of party initi-
ative "to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial."14 Within an adversarial framework, the threat
of harsh recourse may engender compliance without full regard to
the relationship of the information sought to the matter at
hand. 149 A resultant overcaution on the part of counsel might
lead to a clouding of issues through disclosure of irrelevant facts
delivered out of fear of potential sanctions. The discovering
party, aware of the more aggressive attitude of the court under the
deterrence theory, could perceive an offensive weapon within its
grasp and press for more fringe information should the court be
convinced of the data's relevance. 150 Logjams caused by delays
due to noncompliance would not be eliminated. The dilatory ef-
fects of failure to make discovery would be translated into time
spent arguing and deciding motions for protective orders15' and
additional time spent gathering the greater bulk of information
sought.
The weakness of the deterrence theory is, however, more fun-
damental than is reflected by speculative analysis of its possible
effects should it gain acceptance. On a priority scale, the deter-
rence theory exalts discouragement of future hypothetical conduct
over the policy of discovery in a case at bar. Under the deterrence
theory, the severity of the sanction becomes paramount to achiev-
ing the goals of the sanctioning process. In so doing, the theory
runs roughshod over the concept of remedial congruence 52 by
subordinating the larger policy considerations of the sanctions to
the hope that future failures to make discovery will be discour-
aged.
Nevertheless, the deterrence theory has found support in the
Supreme Court of the United States. In overturning a Third Cir-
cuit decision to reinstate a dismissed claim, the Court in National
148. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
149. For an exhaustive analysis of the adversial context of discovery, see W. GLASER,
supra note 17, at 4-14 and Brazil, supra note 9, at 1303-05, 1311-15.
150. Most information is considered relevant for purposes of discovery. "[D]iscovery
at the pretrial stage is not fettered with the rules as to admissibility that apply at a trial, and
the utmost freedom is here allowed .... " C. wRiGHT, supra note 13, § 81, at 399. The
scope of permissible discovery is, therefore, expansive. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 15, § 2007.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
152. See text accompanying notes 118-19 supra.
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Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. 153 indi-
cated its disapproval of the lenity demonstrated by the court of
appeals. National Hockey League involved an antitrust action
brought against the N.H.L. by teams making up the World Hock-
ey Association.54 After a series of consent decrees, only Metro-
politan remained a plaintiff in the action. 155  Interrogatories
submitted by the N.H.L. remained substantially unanswered for
seventeen months, and despite some justifications advanced by
Metropolitan, the district court dismissed the action. 5 The Third
Circuit reversed, concluding that dismissal was inappropriate be-
cause, inter alia, the noncompliance was not willful.157
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed without
hearing arguments in a single per curiam opinion that offered
meager analysis. The Court stated that lenity is to be a
nondeterminative factor when assessing the appropriate rule 37
sanction:
There is a natural tendency on the part of reviewing courts,
properly employing the benefit of hindsight, to be heavily influ-
enced by the severity of outright dismissal as a sanction for fail-
ure to comply .... It is quite reasonable to conclude that a
party who has been subjected to such an order will feel duly
chastened, so that even though he succeeds in having the order
reversed on appeal, he will nonetheless comply promptly with
future discovery orders .... 158
The Court went on to endorse a vigorous approach to the deter-
rence theory:
But here, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the
spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be avail-
able to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to pe-
nalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a
sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such con-
duct in the absence of such a deterrent.' 59
153. 427 U.S. 639, rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1975).
154. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
155. Id at 646.
156. Id at 642. Among the justifications put forth by Metropolitan, as outlined in the
Third Circuit's opinion, were that the lawyers for Metropolitan were unable to gain access
to files because accountants and a former lawyer for Metropolitan had invoked liens on
them, that there were too many interrogatories to be answered in the time allotted, that the
lawyers were confused about when certain answers were due, that a due date had in-
advertantly been omitted from a calender, and that they had erroneously juxtaposed two
other important dates. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188,
1190-91 (3d Cir. 1976).
157. 531 F.2d at 1193.
158. 427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976).
159. Id at 643. This statement of support for the deterrence theory had been followed
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As previously noted, this method of applying the deterrence
theory restricts appellate review to the inquiry of whether the
lower court abused its discretion and not whether, as an original
matter, the appellate court would have done otherwise.160 More-
over, the Supreme Court's decision to focus on future recusant
parties as well as on the case at hand directly conflicts with the
previously discussed multitude of considerations that should be
weighed in approaching a sanctioning order. It also flies in the
face of Dean Pound's admonition that discretion is tied to the case
at bar.161
But even if the deterrence theory is tempered by the applica-
tion of a "least restrictive alternative" approach 62 or by a closer
scrutiny of the record and the district court's exercise of discretion
when a drastic sanction has been imposed, 163 the theory is still
flawed by several realities of district court proceedings. Foremost
among those realities is that the discovery sanctions never have
been 164 and are not now often sought. 165 When the Court states
that the imposition of powerful sanctions must be done with an
eye to the present case and in anticipation of similar transgres-
sions in the future, it is implicitly assuming that such abuse has
reached sufficient proportions in civil trial practice to merit such
measures. A situation in which only eighteen percent of the sup-
posedly aggrieved parties feel a need to resort to a court sanction
to which they are entitled 66 does not appear to be one in which
injury abounds and party initiative is blunted at every turn.167
by a number of lower federal courts. E.g., Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st
Cir. 1977); Paine Webber v. Inmobiliaria Melia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 543 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Emerick v. Fenick Indus., Inc., 539 F.2d 1379, 1381
(5th Cir. 1976).
160. 427 U.S. at 642.
161. R. POUND, supra note 100, at 57-58.
162. Note, Standardsfor Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 27 ME. L. REv. 247 (1975).
The author suggests that the imposition of a sanction turns on a means-ends relationship,
and draws an analogy to the invalidation of regulatory legislation "where it infringes more
broadly than is necessary to accomplish an otherwise legitimate purpose." Id at 265.
Thus, if a sanction "infringes more broadly than is necessary," it, too, should be invali-
dated.
163. E.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977).
164. A 1968 study revealed that of a group of lawyers who felt that their adversaries
had unduly interfered with their discovery efforts only slightly over one-third sought any
form of judicial relief. W. GLASER, supra note 17, at 34-35.
165. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at 18-21.
166. Id at 19. The figure refers to interrogatories left unanswered.
167. This failure to seek enforcement of rights by the discovering party reflects badly
on the concern over future noncompliant parties envisioned by the Supreme Court in Na-
tional Hockey League. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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In order to evaluate the effect of deterrence on the discovery
process, it may be helpful to consider deterrence in another con-
text. In criminal law, deterrence as a theory of punishment is con-
ceived to rely not on the severity of the punishment inflicted-as
stated by the Court in National Hockey League168  but rather on
the swiftness and sureness of the sanction. 6 9 Similarly, the swift-
ness and sureness of the sanction is also recognized as a pinion of
the efficiency of the discovery sanctions.' 7° However, when the
sanctioning process is invoked in only eighteen percent of the in-
stances of delay or failure to answer an interrogatory, 17' no sanc-
tion, regardless of its severity, can be labeled "swift and sure."
Thus, the incremental deterrent value of a more severe sanction
would appear to be negligible and clearly outweighed by its afore-
mentioned drawbacks.
172
The real problem of breakdowns in the discovery process is
not limited to the fact that the rule 37 sanctions have been applied
in a questionable manner. The sanctioning process has also suf-
fered because courts have neither heeded the totality of factors
that weigh in the balance nor taken a sufficiently active role in the
control and operation of the discovery process.1 73 Since the ad-
vent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their consolida-
tion of federal practice in law and equity, there has been a gradual
and continual relaxation of judicial control over the discovery
process. 74  Simultaneously, however, the function and impor-
tance of the process has expanded. Inasmuch as the orderly func-
tion of the process has been left almost exclusively to lawyers
representing opposing litigants, much of the delay and disruption
168. 427 U.S. at 643 ("[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided...
must be available. . . to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence
of such a deterrent).
169. [C]ertainty, considered by itself, has a moderate deterrent effect for all crimes,
while severity acting alone is not associated with lower rates of crime. When
certainty and severity are combined. . . the impact of severity is filtered through
the certainty value. This means that increasing severity in a condition of low
certainty will have little effect on crime rates.
Antunes & Hunt, The Deterrence Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for
Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URn. L. 145, 158 (1973). For evidence correlating effective
imposition of penalties with deterrence, see F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:
THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 158-72 (1973).
170. W. GLASER, supra note 17, at 154.
171. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at 19.
172. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
173. See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at
77-84.
174. Id at 5-10.
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may well be attributed to the diametrically opposed vantage
points of opposing counsel.'75
As a means of injecting a healthy dose of arm's length imparti-
ality into the control of discovery, a recent analysis suggests initia-
tive on the part of district courts to avail themselves of rule 83 to
bolster the rule 37 sanctions. 17 6 Rule 83 reads in pertinent part:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof
may from time to time make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules . . . . In all cases not
provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their prac-
tice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
Bearing in mind the flexibility of rules 37 and 83, the suggestion
that the district courts could meritoriously experiment in discov-
ery control is alluring. Studies and experiments could be imple-
mented to speed the discovery process and make it more efficient.
The courts could attempt to encourage compliance through active
judicial participation, and-backed ultimately by the policy-ori-
ented balance of interests approach outlined throughout this
Note-avail themselves of a direct and informed means for im-
posing sanctions in harmony with the goal of procedure outlined
in rule 1.177
VI. CONCLUSION
Proposals for amendments to the discovery rules are currently
under consideration and are being analyzed by the profession. 7 1
In the time between the present and any eventual adoption of new
discovery processes and sanctions, the existing sanctions must be
focused to achieve optimal efficiency under the current formula-
tion. Fortunately, the sanctions afford flexibility in their applica-
tion and may, when invoked in light of the purposes of discovery
and the policies of the civil rules, foster more efficient practice in
the federal courts. The analysis within rule 37 is discretionary,
and that discretion is circumscribed only by the tractability of the
language of the rule, the particular facts of the case, and the inter-
ests of all involved. To devote disproportionate attention to a no-
175. See Brazil, supra note 9, at 1303-05.
176. P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 13, at 17.
177. For a suggested model of district court control of the discovery process, see id.
The model proposed suggests active judicial management with an emphasis on rule 83.
The amount of control exerted would be tempered by reliance on empirical data compiled
on the amount of discovery information generally sought in similar cases flexibly tailored
to meet the needs of the particular case.
178. Preliminary Draft of ProposedAmendments, 77 F.R.D. 613, 623 (1978).
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tion of deterrence or any other single factor within the factual
equation seems impolitic in light of the rule's innate capacity to
accommodate an expansive spectrum of relevant factors.
Difficult goals are seldom attained without constant vigilance
and concentrated effort. As discovery is intended to represent a
crucial concomitance in the federal formulation designed to lead
to the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion" then, despite distractions encountered along the path, that
goal must remain resolutely in the sight and mind of all who are
enroute. When it falls upon the court to determine whether a
sanction is appropriate, and, if so, which one, that court must pay
particular heed to the sensitivities of the individual matter before
it within the context of the adjudicatory system. If this analysis is
pursued in cognizance of the fundamental aim of procedure,
179
the purposes 80 and policies18 1 underlying discovery, and the func-
tion of discretion, 82 and if consideration is given to remedial con-
gruence, 83 the effects of the sanctions employed," 4 and the
ultimate balance of fairness to be struck among the parties and the
court, then the discovery process may more effectively achieve the
mission it was assigned in 1938.
WLIAM T. DRESCHER
179. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 115-21 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 122-39 supra.
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